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Abstract
In order to enrich dynamic semantic theories with a ‘pragmatic’ capacity, we com-
bine dynamic and nonmonotonic (preferential) logics in a modal logic setting. We
extend a fragment of Van Benthem and De Rijke’s dynamic modal logic with addi-
tional preferential operators in the underlying static logic, which enables us to define
defeasible (pragmatic) entailments over a given piece of discourse. We will show how
this setting can be used for a dynamic logical analysis of preferential resolutions of
ambiguous pronouns in discourse.
1 Introduction
The goal of model-theoretic semantics is to establish an interpretation function from the
expressions of a given language to a class of well-understood mathematical structures (mod-
els). This enables a formal logical understanding of what an expression means and what
its consequences are. For instance, natural language semantics has recently developed a
relatively simple dynamic model-theoretic understanding of the interplay between indefinite
descriptions and anaphoric bindings. These dynamic semantic theories of natural language
give model-theoretic explanations of possible anaphoric bindings, assuming that additional
pragmatics will address the issues of anaphora resolution. A correct dynamic semantic anal-
ysis predicts each of the possible referents available in the context, just as a classical logical
analysis ‘lists’ all possible scoping and lexical ambiguities.
Consider the following simple discourses (1) and (2).
(1) John met Bill at the station. He1 greeted him1.
(2) Bill met John at the station. He1 greeted him1.
∗The first author’s work was supported by CEC project LRE-62-051 (FraCaS). The second author’s work
was in part supported by the National Science Foundation and the Advanced Research Projects Agency under
Grant IRI–9314961 (Integrated Techniques for Generation and Interpretation). We would like to thank the
two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
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The two discourses are semantically equivalent. A precise dynamic semantic analysis would
treat he1 and him1 in both examples as variables that range over the semantic values of John
and Bill, with the additional constraint that the referents of he1 and him1 are different. This
analysis predicts two sets of equally possible bindings. There is, however, a clear preferential
difference between the two discourses. There is a preference for the bindings, he1 = John
and him1 = Bill, in (1), and for the opposite bindings, he1 = Bill and him1 = John, in (2).
Preferential effects on discourse interpretations and the entire issue of ambiguity resolu-
tion have traditionally been put outside the scope of logical semantics, into the more or less
disjoint subfield of ‘pragmatics.’ This academic focus sharply contrasts with the importance
placed on disambiguation and resolution issues in natural language processing (or computa-
tional linguistics), where realistic accounts of naturally occurring discourses and dialogues
are demanded from application systems. Computational accounts, however, often fall short
of logical or model-theoretic formalizations. In artificial intelligence (AI), in contrast, logi-
cal formalization of pragmatics, or defeasible reasoning, was brought into the central focus
of research at an early stage (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969), and led to the development of
nonmonotonic logics.
More recently, there are proposals to incorporate defeasible reasoning within natural
language semantics to approximate the class of realistic conclusions of a given sentence
or discourse (Veltman, 1991; Lascarides and Asher, 1993). In contrast with these specific
proposals,1 we will propose a general framework for preferential dynamic semantics, and
illustrate how the basic properties of discourse pragmatics exhibited by ambiguous pronouns
can be encoded within the framework.
The present framework combines a general model of nonmonotonic logic (Shoham, 1988)
and a general model of dynamic logic (Benthem, 1991; de Rijke, 1992). In this logical setup,
we specify defeasible information and associated entailment relations over a given discourse,
and classify the relative stability of conclusions made on the basis of this additional defeasible
information. Our paper is about a general framework of preferential dynamic semantics
that abstracts away from numerous specific possibilities for how to represent utterance
logical forms and discourse contexts, and how to actually compute preferences. Since logical
formalization of discourse pragmatics is in an early stage of development, we believe that it
benefits immensely from an attempt such as here to sort out general meta-theoretical issues
from specific accounts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the preferential effects on
ambiguous discourse anaphoric pronouns. Section 3 presents our basic logical framework.
Section 4 illustrates formalisms at work in pronoun interpretation in a first-order discourse
logic.
2 Preferences in Ambiguous Pronouns
We summarize, here, the basic properties of preferential effects on discourse semantics. We
focus on ambiguous pronouns in simple discourses, and illustrate the properties of dynam-
1Veltman (1991) defines default reasoning in terms of his update semantics. Lascarides and Asher (1993)
extend Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) with the definition of commonsense entailment given by
Asher and Morreau (1991).
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icity, indeterminacy, defeasibility, and preference class interactions.
2.1 Discourse Pragmatics as Preferential Reasoning
Most present-day linguistic theorists assume the trichotomy of syntax, semantics, and prag-
matics, but there is no single agreed-upon definition of exactly what linguistic pragmatics
is. Some equate it with ‘indexicality’, some with ‘context dependence’, and others with
‘language use’ (Levinson, 1983). There is also a common pipeline view of the trichotomy, in
that pragmatics adds interpretations to the output of semantics that interprets the output
of syntax. In this pipeline view, the direct link between syntax and pragmatics is lost.
We take a logic-inspired definition of pragmatics as the nonmonotonic subsystem char-
acterized by defeasible rules. We also view all defeasible rules to be preferences , so the
pragmatics subsystem corresponds to a subspace of preferential reasoning, which controls
the subspace of possible interpretations carved out by the indefeasible linguistic rules in
the ‘grammar’ subsystem.2 From this perspective, pragmatics is not an underdeveloped
subcomponent of semantics alone, but a system that combines all the preferential aspects
of phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and epistemics. There is evidence that these
heterogeneous linguistic preferences interact with one another, and also with nonlinguis-
tic preferences coming from the commonsense world knowledge. What we have then is a
dichotomy of grammar and pragmatics subsystems rather than a trichotomy. Under this
view, neither indexicality nor context dependence defines pragmatics since there are both
indefeasible and defeasible indexical and context-dependent rules. In fact, in a dynamic ar-
chitecture for discourse semantics, where meaning is given to a sequence of sentences rather
than to a sentence in isolation, context dependence is an inherent architectural property
supporting the anaphoricity of natural language expressions.
2.2 Basic Properties of Discourse Preferences
We will now motivate four basic properties of discourse preferences with examples of
ambiguous discourses with ambiguous pronouns. Kameyama (1996) analyzed a survey result
of pronoun interpretation preferences from the perspective of interacting preference classes
in a dynamic discourse processing architecture. This analysis identified a set of basic ‘design
features’ that characterize the preferential effects on discourse meaning, and outlined how
they combine to settle on preferred discourse interpretations. These basic properties can be
summarized as dynamicity, (in)determinacy, defeasibility, and preference class interactions .
Table 1 shows those examples discussed by Kameyama (1996). In a survey, speakers had
to pick the preferred reference of pronouns in the last sentence of each discourse example
(shown in italics).3 Table 2 shows the survey results.4 These and similar examples will be
2We assume, following the theoretical linguistic tradition, that there is a linguistic rule system consisting
of indefeasible rules of morphosyntax and semantics, and call it the ‘grammar subsystem’. We also assume
that most commonsense rules are defeasible, but leave the question open as to whether there are also
indefeasible commonsense rules.
3The respondents were told to read the discourses with a ‘neutral’ intonation, for the survey was intended
to investigate only unstressed pronouns.
4The χ2
df=1
significance for each example was computed by adding an evenly divided number of the
‘unclear’ answers to each explicitly selected answer, reflecting the assumption that an ‘unclear’ answer
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Grammatical Effects:
A. John hit Bill. Mary told him to go home.
B. Bill was hit by John. Mary told him to go home.
C. John hit Bill. Mary hit him too.
D. John hit Bill. He doesn’t like him.
E. John hit Bill. He hit him back.
K. Babar went to a bakery. He greeted the baker.
He pointed at a blueberry pie.
L. Babar went to a bakery. The baker greeted him.
He pointed at a blueberry pie.
Commonsense Effects:
F. John hit Bill. He was severely injured.
G. John hit Arnold Schwarzenegger. He was severely injured.
H. John hit the Terminator. He was severely injured.
I. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw Billy at the door.
He hit him on the chin. He was severely injured.
J. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw a group of boys at the door.
He hit one of them on the chin. He was severely injured.
Table 1: Discourse Examples in the Survey
used in this paper.
2.2.1 Dynamicity
We are interested in discourse pragmatics, that is, discourse semantics enriched with pref-
erences, so it is natural to start from where discourse semantics leaves off, not losing what
discourse semantics has accomplished with its dynamic architecture and the view of sentence
meaning as its context change potential. We thus take dynamicity to be a basic architectural
requirement in an integrated theory of discourse semantics and pragmatics.5
The discourse examples (1) and (2), repeated here, demonstrate the fact that the pre-
ferred interpretation of an utterance depends on the preceding discourse context.
(1) John met Bill at the station. He1 greeted him1.
(2) Bill met John at the station. He1 greeted him1.
The two discourses are semantically equivalent. Two male persons, ‘John’ and ‘Bill’, engage
themselves in a symmetric action of meeting. Both individuals are available for anaphoric
reference in the next sentence, and since the two pronouns in He greeted him must be
disjoint in reference and each pronoun has two possible values, dynamic semantic theories
predict two equally possible interpretations, John greeted Bill and Bill greeted John.
However, these discourses have different preferred values for these pronouns. In (1), due to
shows a genuine ambiguity.
5There are two levels of dynamicity that affect utterance interpretation in discourse. One is the utterance-
by-utterance dynamicity that affects the overall discourse meaning, and the other is the word-by-word or
constituent-by-constituent dynamicity that affects the meaning of the utterance being interpreted. In this
paper, we will focus on the former.
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Answers χ2
df=1
p
A. John 42 Bill 0 Unclear 5 37.53 p < .001
B. John 7 Bill 33 Unclear 7 14.38 p < .001
C. John 0 Bill 47 Unclear 0 47 p < .001
D. J. dislikes B. 42 B. dislikes J. 0 Unclear 5 37.53 p < .001
E. John hit Bill 2 Bill hit John 45 Unclear 0 39.34 p < .001
K. Babar 13 Baker 0 Unclear 0 13 p < .001
L. Babar 3 Baker 10 Unclear 0 3.77 .05 < p < .10
F. John 0 Bill 46 Unclear 1 45.02 p < .001
G. John 24 Arnold 13 Unclear 10 2.57 .10 < p < .20
H. John 34 Terminator 6 Unclear 7 16.68 p < .001
I. Tommy 3 Billy 17 Unclear 1 9.33 .001 < p < .01
J. Tommy 10 Boy 7 Unclear 3 0.45 .50 < p < .70
Table 2: Survey Results
a grammatical parallelism preference (exhibited by discourse D in Table 1), the preferred
interpretation is John greeted Bill. In (2), the same parallelism preference leads to the
reverse interpretation of Bill greeted John.
Dynamic semantics has been motivated by examples such as A man walks in the park.
He whistles., where an existential scope extends beyond the syntactic sentence boundary
to bind pronouns. Analogously, preferential dynamic semantics would have to account for
examples such as (1) and (2), where different syntactic configurations of the same semantic
content have different extended effects on the preferred interpretation of pronouns.
2.2.2 (In)determinacy
One notable feature of the survey results shown in Table 2 is that the resulting χ2df=1 signif-
icance varies widely. We consider preference to be significant if p < .05, weakly significant
if .05 < p < .10, and insignificant if .10 < p as a straightforward application of elemen-
tary statistics. It is reasonable to assume that the statistical significance of a preference
corresponds to how determinate the given preference is. Significant preferences are thus
unambiguous and determinate, and insignificant preferences indicate ambiguities and inde-
terminacies. The preferential machinery then must allow both unambiguous and ambiguous
preferences to be concluded, rather than always producing a single maximally preferred
conclusion.
Preferential reasoning is supposed to resolve ambiguities, however, and unresolved pref-
erential ambiguities make discourses incoherent. It seems reasonable to assume a discourse
pragmatic meta-principle that says, a discourse should produce a single maximally preferred
interpretation. Such a meta-principle is akin to Grice-style maxims of conversation, where
a preferred discourse is truthful, adequately informative, perspicuous, relevant, and so forth
(Grice, 1975). It seems that this kind of a meta-principle is needed to assure that speakers
try to avoid indeterminate preferences precisely because the underlying preferential logical
machinery does not guarantee determinacy.
We thus identify a basic property of preferential reasoning — preferential conclusions are
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sometimes determinate with a single maximally preferred interpretation, and other times
indeterminate with multiple maximally preferred interpretations. The latter results in a
genuine ambiguity, or incoherence, violating the basic pragmatic felicity condition.
Let us turn to concrete examples. Both discourses (1) and (2) have determinate preferred
interpretations due to the grammatical parallelism preference. In contrast, discourse (3)
leads to no clear preference because no relevant preferences converge on a single determinate
choice. Discourse (3) is thus infelicitous.
(3) John and Bill met at the station. He greeted him.
2.2.3 Defeasibility
A conclusion is defeasible if it may have to be retracted when some additional facts are
introduced. This property is also called nonmonotonicity, and is the defining property of
preferences. This property also defines pragmatic, as opposed to grammatical, conclusions
under the present assumption that grammatical conclusions are indefeasible.
The following continuation of (1) illustrates defeasibility.
(4) John met Bill at the station. He greeted him. John greeted him back.
In (4), the third sentence, with its indefeasible semantics associated with the adverb back
(as in discourse E in Table 1), forces a reversal of the preferred interpretation concluded
after the second sentence. This on-line reversal produces a discourse-level garden path effect,
analogous to the sentence-level phenomena such as in The horse passed the barn fell or The
astronomer married a star.
Garden path effects are cases of preference reversal , which should not be confused with
explicit retractions or negations of indefeasible conclusions. The former can be triggered
implicitly, whereas the latter must be explicitly asserted. The latter is illustrated by the
following discourse-level repair example, where the explicit retraction signal No negates the
immediately preceding assertion, and opens a way for a different fact to be asserted in the
next sentence.
(5) John met Bill at the station. No. He met Paul there.
2.2.4 Preference Classes
When multiple preferences simultaneously succeed, the combined effects are quite unlike the
familiar patterns of grammatical rule interactions. When mutually contradictory indefeasi-
ble rules both succeed, the whole interpretation is supposed to fail. For instance, John met
Mary at the station. He knows that she loves himself. leads to no indefeasible interpretation.
In contrast, preferences may override other preferences that contradict them. Ambiguities
persist only when mutually contradictory preferences are equally strong. A logical model of
preferential reasoning, therefore, must predict ambiguity resolutions due to overrides.
One type of override is predicted by the so-called Penguin Principle, where the conclusion
based on a more specific premise wins (see Lascarides and Asher (1993) for a linguistic
application). This principle does not explain all the override phenomena in pragmatic
reasoning, however. We must posit the existence of preference classes to predict overrides
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among groups of preferences (Kameyama, 1996). We thus distinguish between two kinds of
conflict resolutions in pragmatics, one due to the Penguin Principle and the other due to
preference class overrides.6 In this paper, we focus on the interaction between two major
preference classes — the syntactic preferences based on the surface structure of utterances7
and the commonsense preferences based on the commonsense world knowledge.
First consider two examples (A and B) in Table 1 repeated here.
(6) John hit Bill. Mary told him to go home.
(7) Bill was hit by John. Mary told him to go home.
Discourses (6) and (7) illustrate a syntactic preference — the preference for the main gram-
matical subject to be the antecedent for a pronoun in the next utterance. Henceforth, this
syntactic preference is called the subject antecedent preference. In (6), the preferred value
of the pronoun him is John. In (7), with passivization, the preferred value shifts to Bill.
Since passivization does not affect the thematic roles (such as Agent or Theme) of these ref-
erents, we conclude that this preference shift is directly caused by the shift in grammatical
functions.
Next, consider the following.8
(8) John hit Bill. He got injured.
(9) The wall was hit by a champagne glass. It broke into pieces.
Discourses (8) and (9) illustrate that the above subject antecedent preference is overridden
by a stronger class of preferences having to do with commonsense causal knowledge — in
these cases, about hitting causing injuring or breaking.
We thus assume that there are preference classes, or modules, that independently con-
clude the preferred interpretation of an utterance, and that these class-internal conclusions
interact in a certain general overriding pattern to produce the final preference. Table 3 shows
the survey result analyzed from this perspective of preference class interactions. Based on
this analysis, we will model the following general patterns of preference interactions:
• Indefeasible syntax and semantics override all preferences.
• Commonsense preferences override syntactic preferences.9
6Asher and Lascarides (1995) implement a class-level override in terms of a ‘meta-penguin principle’
forced on rule classes. Their law of ‘Lexical Impotence’ (p. 96) predicts that discourse inferences generally
override default lexical inferences.
7This includes both the parallelism and attentional preferences discussed by Kameyama (1996). It was
conjectured there that these preference classes may be independent subclasses of a larger ‘entity-level’
preference class, which is qualitatively different from the ‘propositional-level’ commonsense preference class.
8(8) is a slight variation of F in Table 1. (9) is a variant of Len Schubert’s (personal communication)
example.
9This overriding can be difficult when the syntactic preference is extremely strong. For instance, example
I in Table 1 creates an utterance-internal garden-path effect where the first syntactically preferred choice
for Tommy is retracted in favor of a more plausible interpretation supported by commonsense preferences.
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Syntactic Pref. Commonsense Pref. Semantics Winner
A. John unclear — Syntactic Pref.
B. Bill unclear — Syntactic Pref.
C. John unclear Bill Semantics
D. John–Bill unclear — Syntactic Pref.
E. John–Bill unclear Bill–John Semantics
K. Babar unclear — Syntactic Pref.
L. Baker unclear — Syntactic Pref.
F. John Bill — Commonsense Pref.
G. John John/Arnold — Commonsense Pref.
H. John John — Commonsense Pref.
I. Tommy Billy — Commonsense (but difficult)
J. Tommy Boy(/Tommy) — ??
Table 3: Preference Interactions
• Syntactic preferences dominate the final interpretation only if there are no relevant
commonsense preferences.
The general overriding pattern we identify here is schematically shown as follows, where ≥
represents a ‘can override’ relation:
Indefeasible
Syntax and Semantics
≥
Commonsense
Preferences
≥
‘Syntactic’
Preferences
There are a number of questions about these preference classes. For instance, how do they
arise, how many classes are there, and why can some classes override others?10 In this paper,
we simply assume the existence of multiple preference classes with predetermined override
relationships, and propose a logical machinery that implements their interactions.
We will now turn to the logical machinery that will be used to model pragmatic reasoning
with the requisite properties of dynamicity, indeterminacy, defeasibility, and preference class
interactions.
3 Dynamic Preferential Reasoning
We have chosen to combine dynamics and preferences in a most general logical setting in
order to achieve logical transparency and theoretical independence in the following sense.
We hope that the logical simplicity facilitates future meta-logical investigations on the inter-
action of dynamics and preferential reasoning, and enables applications to a wider variety
of preferential (defeasible) phenomena. We will thus combine the most general dynamic
10Kameyama (1996) proposed that there are three preference classes that respectively concern preferred
updates of three data structure components of the dynamic context. These three preference classes also
seem to correspond with the three classes of discourse coherence relations independently proposed by Kehler
(1995) to account for the constraints on ellipsis and other cohesive forms. This indicates a potential inte-
gration of two apparently unrelated notions — dynamic context data structure components and coherence
relations.
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logical approach and the most general logical approach to defeasible reasoning we know.
The dynamic (relational) setting consists of the core of the so-called dynamic modal logic
of Van Benthem (1991) and de Rijke (1992). Our encoding of defeasibility follows Shoham’s
(1988) preferential modeling of nonmonotonic logics.
Subsection 3.1 will outline dynamic modal logic, following Jaspars and Krahmer’s (1996)
fragment of the original logic.11 This part encodes the dynamicity property. Subsections 3.2
and 3.3 will show how preferential reasoning can be accommodated within this fragment of
dynamic modal logic. This addition encodes defeasibility, indeterminacy, and differentiation
of preference classes. Finally, Subsection 3.4 discusses possible pragmatic meta-constraints
on preferential interpretation definable in this logical setting.
3.1 Basic Dynamic Modal Logic
Jaspars and Krahmer (1996) present specifications of current dynamic semantic theories in
terms of dynamic modal logic (dml), and show how dml can be used as a universal setting
in which the differences and similarities among different dynamic semantic theories can be
clarified. The underlying philosophy of this unified dynamics is that dynamic theories evolve
from ‘dynamifying’ an ordinary logic by implementing an order of information growth over
the models of this logic.
To start with, one chooses a static language L to reason about the content of information
states S by means of an interpretation function: [[.]] : L −→ 2S . This setting most often
consists of a (part of) well-known logic interpreted over a class of well-known models. These
models are then taken to be the units of information, that is, information states, within
the dynamic modal framework. The second (new) step consists of a definition of an order
of information growth, ⊑, over these information states. We write s ⊑ t whenever the
state t contains more information than s according to this definition. The conclusive step is
the choice of the dynamic language L∗, which essentially comes down to selecting different
dynamic modal operators for reasoning about the relation ⊑. The triple 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 is also
called an L-information model .
Conventions. IfM = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 is an L-information model, then we write s ❁ t whenever
s ⊑ t and not t ⊑ s. The state t is called a proper extension of s. If T ⊆ S then the minimal
states in T is the set {t ∈ T | ∀s ∈ T : s ⊑ t⇒ t ⊑ s}. We will assume that every nonempty
subset of information states contains minimal states. Most often, dynamic semantic theories
can be described on the basis of information models that satisfy this constraint.
3.1.1 Static and Dynamic Meaning
On the basis of these information models, one can distinguish between static and dynamic
meanings of propositions. The static meaning of a proposition ϕ ∈ L with respect to an
L-information model M = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉, written as [[ϕ]]M , is the same as [[ϕ]]. The reason is
that we want to define a dynamic modal extension L∗ on top of L, which requires static
interpretation as well ([[.]]M : L∗ −→ 2S).
11To be precise, the relational part of this setting is a fragment of the relational expressivity of original
dynamic logic.
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Given the relational structure, that is, the preorder of information growth ⊑, over the
information states S, we are able to define a dynamic meaning of a proposition. Roughly
speaking, the dynamic meaning of a proposition is understood as its effect on a given
information state s ∈ S .12 In other words, we wish to define the meaning(s) of a proposition
ϕ in the context of an information state s ∈ S: [[ϕ]]M,s.
In general, different dynamic interpretations of a proposition ϕ are defined according to
how ϕ operates on an information state. For example, ϕ might be added to or retracted
from an information state, or, in a somewhat more complicated case, ϕ may describe the
content of a revision to an information state. Given such an operation o, we will define the
o-meaning of a proposition ϕ with respect to an information state s ∈ S (in M): [[ϕ]]oM,s.
The proposition ϕ is the content of an operation and o specifies the type of operation. In
dml, all these operations are defined in terms of the growth relation ⊑.
Jaspars and Krahmer (1996) postulate that in most well-known logics of mental action
or change, we need only four basic operation types: extension (+) and reduction (−), and
their minimal counterparts, update (+µ) and downdate (−µ). Given an information order
⊑ for a given set of information states S, these actions are defined as follows:
[[ϕ]]+M,s = {t ∈ S | s ⊑ t, t ∈ [[ϕ]]M}
[[ϕ]]−M,s = {t ∈ S | t ⊑ s, t 6∈ [[ϕ]]M}
[[ϕ]]+µM,s = {t ∈ [[ϕ]]
+
M,s | ∀u ∈ S : u ∈ [[ϕ]]
+
M,s & u ⊑ t ⇒ t ⊑ u}
[[ϕ]]−µM,s = {t ∈ [[ϕ]]
−
M,s | ∀u ∈ S : u ∈ [[ϕ]]
−
M,s & t ⊑ u ⇒ u ⊑ t}.
(10)
Furthermore, for every action type o we use [[ϕ]]oM,T as an abbreviation of the set
⋃
s∈T [[ϕ]]
o
M,s
(the o-meaning of ϕ with respect to T ) for all T ⊆ S. A special instance of particular
importance is the o-meaning with respect to the minimal states in M : minM = {s ∈ S |
∀t ∈ S : t ⊑ s ⇒ s ⊑ t}. We write [[ϕ]]oM,min instead of [[ϕ]]
o
M,minM
, and refer to this set
as the minimal o-meaning of ϕ in M . This is the meaning of a proposition with respect
to an empty context. We will also use the notation minM T for a given subset T ⊆ S of
minimal states in T . We assumed above that minS T 6= ∅ whenever T 6= ∅, and therefore,
[[ϕ]]+M,s 6= ∅ ⇒ [[ϕ]]
+µ
M,s 6= ∅ (the same holds for − with respect to −µ).
Dynamic semantic theories most often describe relational meanings of propositions ob-
tained from abstractions over the context. For every operation o, we will call the relational
interpretation the o-meaning of ϕ (in M).
[[ϕ]]oM = {〈s, t〉 | t ∈ [[ϕ]]
o
M,s}.(11)
Finally, a dynamic modal extension L∗ of L can be defined. It supplies unary dynamic
modal operators of the form [ϕ]
o
and 〈ϕ〉o, whose static interpretations are as follows:
[[[ϕ]
o
ψ]]M = {s ∈ S | [[ϕ]]
o
M,s ⊆ [[ψ]]M}
[[〈ϕ〉o ψ]]M = {s ∈ S | [[ϕ]]oM,s ∩ [[ψ]]M 6= ∅}.
(12)
For example, a proposition of the form [ϕ ]+ ψ means that extending the current state with
ϕ necessarily leads to a ψ-state, while 〈ϕ 〉−µ ψ means that it is possible to retract ϕ from
12Note that linguistic actions most often affect the mental state of some chosen agents or interpreters,
sharply contrasting with physical actions that affect physical situations, as studied in AI for analysis of
so-called frame problems, e.g., Shoham (1988).
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the current state in a minimal way and end up with the information ψ. In this paper, we
will discuss only the extension (+) and update (+µ) meanings of propositions.
Notational conventions. Let C be a set of connectives. Then we write L + C for the
smallest superset of L closed under the connectives in C. L ∗ C denotes the smallest
superset of L closed under the connectives appearing in L and the connectives in C.
3.1.2 Static and Dynamic Entailment
Entailments are defined as relations between sequences of formulae and single formulae.
The former contain the assumptions and the latter are the conclusions of the entailments.
To make concise definitions, we also define the static and dynamic meaning of a sequence
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, abbreviated as ~ϕ, in a dynamic modal language L∗. Let M = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 ∈ ML,
then
[[~ϕ]]M =
n⋂
i=1
[[ϕi]]M and [[~ϕ]]
o
M = [[ϕ1]]
o
M ◦ . . . ◦ [[ϕn]]
o
M .
13(13)
The former part defines the static meaning of ~ϕ, and the latter part defines the o-meaning
of ~ϕ. The o-meaning of ~ϕ is the relation of input/output pairs of consecutively o-executing
(expanding, updating,...) ϕ1 through ϕn.
We will subsequently write [[~ϕ]]oM,s for the set {t ∈ S | 〈s, t〉 ∈ [[~ϕ]]
o
M} and [[~ϕ]]
o
M,T =⋃
s∈T [[~ϕ]]
o
M,s for all s ∈ S and T ⊆ S. We will write [[~ϕ]]
o
M,min for the minimal o-meaning of
the sequence ~ϕ.
Definition 1 LetM be some class of L-information models, and let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ be propo-
sitions of some dynamic modal extension L∗ of L. We define the following entailments for
discourse ϕ1, . . . , ϕn (~ϕ):
• ~ϕ statically entails ψ with respect to M if [[~ϕ]]M ⊆ [[ψ]]M .
• ~ϕ dynamically entails ψ according to the operation o (or ~ϕ o-entails ψ) with respect
to M if [[~ϕ]]oM,s ⊆ [[ψ]]M for all M ∈ M and s in M .
• ~ϕ minimally o-entails ψ with respect to M if [[~ϕ]]oM,min ⊆ [[ψ]]M for all M ∈M.
We use ~ϕ |=M ψ, ~ϕ |=
o
M ψ and ~ϕ |=
min o
M ψ as abbreviations for these three entailment
relations, respectively.
Note that if the modal operators [ϕ]
o
are present within the dynamic modal language L∗,
then the notion of o-entailment in Definition 1 boils down to the static entailment |=M
[ϕ1]
o
. . . [ϕn]
o
ψ.
When we think of operations as updates as in the following sections, the minimal dynamic
meaning of a sequence ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is the same as updating the minimal states (the initial
context) consecutively with ϕ1 through ϕn. This interpretation is the one we will use for
the interpretation of a discourse or text ~ϕ. Of course, as will be the case for most pragmatic
13The operation ◦ stands for relational composition. For two relations R1, R2 ⊆ S2: R1 ◦ R2 = {〈s, t〉 ∈
S2 | ∃u ∈ S : R1(s, u) & R2(u, t)}.
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inferences, the minimal states of an information model should not be states of complete
ignorance. To draw the defeasible conclusions discussed in the previous section, we need
to add some defeasible background information. For this purpose we need the following
notation. If Γ ⊆ L∗, then we writeMΓ for the subclass of models inM that supports all the
formulae in Γ: {M = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 ∈ M | [[γ]]M = S for all γ ∈ Γ}. The entailment ~ϕ |=
min+µ
MΓ
ψ covers the interpretation of a discourse ~ϕ in the context or background knowledge of Γ.
3.2 Simple Preferential Extensions
Shoham (1988) introduced preferential reasoning into nonmonotonic logics. The central idea
is to add a preferential structure over the models of the logic chosen as the inference mech-
anism. This preferential structure is most often some partial or pre-order. A nonmonotonic
inference, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |≈ ψ, then says that ψ holds in all the maximally preferred ~ϕ-models.
In many nonmonotonic formalisms such as Reiter’s (1980) default logic, an additional
preferential structure of an assumption set ~ϕ is specified by explicit default assumptions ∆,
which are defeasible. The central idea is to use ‘as much information from ∆as possible’ as
long as it is consistent with the strict assumptions Φ. We will also encode this maximality
preference in our definition. In this paper, we use a preferential operator p to specify the
additional defeasible information. A proposition of the form pϕ refers to the maximally
preferred ϕ-states.
3.2.1 Single Preference Classes
Preferential reasoning can be accommodated within the dml framework by assigning an
additional preferential structure to the space of information states. There are essentially
two ways to do this. In one method, the preferential structure is added to the static structure
over information states ([[.]]), and in the other method, it is added to the dynamic structure
on these states (⊑). We take the first, simpler, option in this paper.14
As explained in Subsection 2.2.4, the preferential reasoning for anaphoric resolution
needs to take different preference classes into account. In Subsection 3.3, we will give dml-
style definitions for such structures, which will be a straightforward generalization of the
following definition of a single preference class.
Definition 2 Extension with a single preference class:
• A single preferential extension Lp of the static language L is the smallest superset of
L such that pϕ ∈ Lp for all ϕ ∈ L.
• A preferential L-model is an information Lp-model M = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉, with [[.]] repre-
senting a pair of interpretation functions
〈
0[[.]], 1[[.]]
〉
such that M0 = 〈S,⊑, 0[[.]]〉 and
M1 = 〈S,⊑, 1[[.]]〉 are L-information models, and [[ϕ]] = 0[[ϕ]] and [[pϕ]] = 1[[ϕ]] for all
ϕ ∈ L.
14The latter, more complex, option would be a more balanced combination of dynamic and preferential
reasoning because the preferential structure is represented at the same level of information order over which
dynamicity is defined. From this perspective, the preferential structuring of models of a given logic that
supplies a nonmonotonic component is analogous to dynamifying a logic by informational structuring as
described by Jaspars and Krahmer (1996). Such investigations are left for a future study.
• If M is a class of L-information models, then the class of all preferential L models
whose nonpreferential part (0) is a member of M is called the single-preferential
enrichment of M.
• If L∗ = L +(∗) C, then L∗p refers to the language Lp +(∗) C.
The interpretation function [[.]] consists of an indefeasible part 0[[.]] and a defeasible part
1[[.]]. Both parts are interpretation functions of the static language: 0,1[[.]] : L −→ 2S . The
indefeasible part replaces the ordinary interpretation function, while the additional defeasi-
ble part is the ‘pragmatic’ strengthening of this standard reading. Note that a preferential
extension gives us a set of preferred states, allowing both determinate and indeterminate
interpretations.
3.2.2 Dynamic Preferential Meaning and Preferential Entailment
Definition (14) illustrates the static and dynamic preferential meaning of a sentence ϕ analo-
gous to the nonpreferential definitions presented in Subsection 3.1.1. The static preferential
meaning of a sentence ϕ (in a model M) is written as 〈〈ϕ〉〉M , and the ‘dynamic’ preferential
meaning of ϕ with respect to a given information state (context) s in a model M is written
as 〈〈ϕ〉〉M,s.
〈〈ϕ〉〉M = [[pϕ]](= 1[[ϕ]])
〈〈ϕ〉〉oM,s =
{
[[pϕ]]oM,s if [[pϕ]]
o
M,s 6= ∅
[[ϕ]]oM,s otherwise.
(14)
In line with the definitions of Subsection 3.1.1, we write 〈〈ϕ〉〉oM for the relational abstraction
of 〈〈ϕ〉〉oM,s. Our definition of the preferential dynamic meaning of a discourse ϕ1, . . . , ϕn = ~ϕ
is written as 〈〈~ϕ〉〉oM,s, and its definition deviates from the way [[~ϕ]]
o
M,s has been defined
above because a simple relational composition of the preferential dynamic readings of single
sentences does not give us a satisfactory definition. The failure of normal composition in
this respect can be illustrated by the following simple abstract example. Suppose ~ϕ = ϕ1, ϕ2
is a two-sentence discourse with
[[pϕ1]]
+µ
M,a = {b, c}, [[ϕ2]]
+µ
M,1 = {d}, [[pϕ2]]
+µ
M,1 = ∅ and [[pϕ2]]
+µ
M,2 = {e}.(15)
We obtain both 〈a, d〉, 〈a, e〉 ∈ 〈〈ϕ1〉〉M ◦ 〈〈ϕ2〉〉M . The second pair (〈a, e〉) is composed of
maximally preferred readings while the first pair (〈a, d〉) is not. Because these two pairs are
both equal members of the composition, such a definition of the preferential meaning of a
discourse is not satisfactory.
The two-sentence discourse in this example has four possible readings: (1) composing the
two defeasible/preferential readings, (2) composing the indefeasible reading of one sentence
and the defeasible reading of the other sentence in two possible orders, and (3) composing
the two indefeasible readings. As we said earlier, it is reasonable to use as much preference
as possible, which means that (1) should be the ‘best’ composition, the two possibilities in
(2) should be the next best, and (3) should be the ‘worst’. We will encode this preferential
ordering based on the amount of preferences into the entailment definition. What about then
the two possible ways of mixing indefeasible and defeasible readings of the two sentences in
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the case of (2)? A purely amount-based comparison would not differentiate them. Are they
equally preferred?
In addition to the sensitivity to the amount of overall preferences, we hypothesize that
the discourse’s linear progression factor also gives rise to a preferential ordering. We thus
distinguish between the two compositions of indefeasible and defeasible readings in (2), and
assign a higher preference to the composition in which the first sentence has the defea-
sible/preferential reading rather than the indefeasible reading. The underlying intuition
is that the defeasibility of information is inversely proportional to the flow of time. It is
harder to defeat conclusions drawn earlier in the given discourse. This has to do with the
fading of nonsemantic memory with time. Earlier (semantic) conclusions tend to persist,
while explicit sentence forms fade away as discourse continues. It seems easier to distinguish
(defeasible) conclusions from recently given information than from information given earlier.
We thus take the preferential context-sensitive reading of a discourse ~ϕ = ϕ1, . . . , ϕn to
be the interpretation that results from applying preferential rules as much as possible and
as early as possible. This type of interpretation can be defined on the basis of an induction
on the length of discourses:
2k[[~ϕ]]oM,s = [[ϕn]]M,T and
2k+1[[~ϕ]]oM,s = [[pϕn]]M,T with T =
k[[ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1]]
o
M,s.
(16)
Note that k < 2n−1 in this inductive definition. 0[[ϕ1]]M,s and
1[[ϕ1]]M,s are given by the
L-information model M . The set of states k[[~ϕ]]oM,s is called the o-meaning of ~ϕ of priority
k with respect to s in M . In this way, we obtain 2n readings of a given discourse. The
preferential o-meaning of a discourse ~ϕ (w.r.t. s in M) is then the same as the nonempty
interpretation of the highest priority larger than 0, and if all these readings are empty, then
the preferential o-meaning coincides with the completely indefeasible reading of priority 0.
〈〈~ϕ〉〉oM,s =
k[[~ϕ]]oM,s
with k = max
(
{i | i[[~ϕ]]oM,s 6= ∅, 0 < i < 2
n} ∪ {0}
)
.
(17)
Note that application of this definition to example (15) yields 〈〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉〉
+µ
M,0 = {e}. Definition
(17) leads to the following succinct definition of preferential dynamic entailment:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |≈oM ψ ⇔ 〈〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉〉
o
M,s ⊆ [[ψ]]M
for all s in M , for all M ∈M.
(18)
This definition says that for every input state of a discourse ~ϕ, the maximally preferred
readings of the discourse always lead to ψ-states. We write ~ϕ |≈min oM ψ whenever 〈〈~ϕ〉〉
o
M min ⊆
[[ψ]]M for all M ∈M (minimal preferential dynamic entailment).
3.3 Multiple Preference Classes
Now we turn to information models of multiple preference classes needed for formalizing
the preference interaction in pronoun resolution, as motivated in Section 2. If we assume a
linear priority order on these preference classes, then it is not hard to generalize Definition 2
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of a single preference class given in Subsection 3.2.1. We will assume such determinate
overriding relations among preference classes here.15
Definition 3 Extension with multiple preference classes:
• A multiple (m) preferential extension Lp,m of L is the smallest superset of L such that
pi ϕ ∈ Lp,m for all ϕ ∈ L.
• A multiple (m) preferential L-model is a Lp,m-information model 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 such that
[[.]] =
〈
0[[.]], . . . ,m[[.]]
〉
with Mi = 〈S,⊑, i[[.]]〉 ∈ ML for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, and [[ϕ]] =
0[[ϕ]] and [[pi ϕ]] =
i[[ϕ]] for all ϕ ∈ L and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
• The class of m-preferential enrichments of a class of L information models M is the
class of all preferential L models whose indefeasible part (0) is a member of M.
Intuitively, pi ϕ says that the current state is a preferred state according to the i-th
preference class and the content ϕ. We use a simple generalization of the preferential
dynamic meaning given in the previous section for the singular preference setting. For a
given discourse ~ϕ = ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, we define (m + 1)n readings and define their associated
priority in the same manner as in (16). Let k < (m + 1)n−1 and T = k[[ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1]]
o
M,s.
Then (m+1)k[[~ϕ]]oM,s = [[ϕn]]
o
M,T and
(m+1)k+i[[~ϕ]]oM,s = [[pi ϕn]]
o
M,T for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The
preferential o-meaning of ~ϕ with respect to a state s in an information model M , 〈〈~ϕ〉〉oM,s,
is defined in the same way as for the single preferential case (17): replace 2 with m+ 1.
3.4 Pragmatic Meta-constraints
For most applications, however, this definition is far too general, and we need to regulate
the interplay of indefeasible and defeasible interpretations with additional constraints. We
discuss some candidates here. Let M =
〈
S,⊑,
〈
0[[.]], 1[[.]]
〉〉
be a preferential L-model.
Principle 1 (Realism) Every preferential ϕ-state, or pϕ-state, is a ϕ-state itself:16
1[[ϕ]] ⊆ 0[[ϕ]].
This principle is perhaps too strict. In some types of defeasible reasoning, we would like
to assign preferential meanings to meaningless or ill-formed input, which would give us the
robustness to recover from errors. Such robustness can be expressed in terms of a restriction
to nonempty indefeasible readings as follows: 0[[ϕ]] 6= ∅ ⇒ 1[[ϕ]] ⊆ 0[[ϕ]] (Robust Realism).
Principle 2 (Minimal Preference) In minimal information states, if a proposition has an
indefeasible reading, it should also have a preferential reading:
[[ϕ]]oM,min 6= ∅ ⇒ [[pϕ]]
o
M,min 6= ∅.
15Kameyama (1996) points out that this is not always the case, but in most cases, strict linearity can be
enforced through ‘uniting’ multiple preference classes of an equal strength into a single one: [[(p∪ p′)ϕ]] =
[[pϕ]] ∪ [[p′ ϕ]].
16Compare with the ‘realism’ principle (Cohen and Levesque, 1990): all intended or goal worlds of a
rational agent should be epistemically possible. This constraint is often used to distinguish between an
agent’s desires and intentions.
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The intuition here is that in a minimal state there should be no obstacles that prevent
the interpreter from using his preferential expectations or prejudices. In section 4, we will
discuss some variants of this principle, which are required to account for certain anaphora
resolution preferences.
Principle 3 (Preservation of Equivalence) Two propositions with the same indefeasible
content should also have the same defeasible content:
0[[ϕ]] = 0[[ψ]]⇒ 1[[ϕ]] = 1[[ψ]].
This principle is not always desirable.17 For example, in discourses (1) and (2), John
met Bill and Bill met John have the same semantic/indefeasible content, but different
pragmatic/defeasible readings. However, some weaker types of equivalence preservation
need to play a role for a satisfactory treatment of anaphoric resolution. Such weakenings
will also be discussed in section 4.
Principle 4 (Complete Determinacy) Every preferential ϕ-extension of a given information
state s has at most one maximal element.
#(1[[ϕ]]+µM,s) ≤ 1 for all s.
This excludes indeterminacy described in Subsection 2.2.2, prohibiting Nixon Diamonds.
Intuitively, it says that pragmatics always enforces certainty. In other words, in cases of
semantic uncertainty, pragmatics always enforces a single choice. For example, discourse
(3) should always lead to a single pragmatic solution. Therefore, as argued earlier, this
constraint is also unrealistic.
4 Toward a Preferential Discourse Logic
We will discuss, here, two different instances of preferential extensions of the dml-setting of
the previous section. As we have seen, such an instantiation requires a specification of static
and dynamic modal languages and a class of information models. In Subsection 4.1, we will
discuss a simple propositional logic, and explain how simple defeasible (preferential) propo-
sitional entailments can or cannot be drawn from a set of preferential rules. Our examples
will illustrate the defeasible inference patterns commonly called the Penguin Principle and
the Nixon Diamond. In Subsection 4.2, we will define a much richer dynamic semantics that
integrates the defeasible propositional inferences explained in Subsection 4.1 into anaphora
resolution preferences. Such a combination is needed to account for the preferential effects
on anaphora resolution. In Subsection 4.3, we will define first-order variants of pragmatic
meta-constraints. In Subsection 4.4, we will illustrate the first-order preferential discourse
logic with discourse examples with ambiguous pronouns as discussed in Section 2.
17This principle is often used in nonmonotonic logics. It implies, for example, the dominance of the default
conclusions from more specific information (0[[ϕ]] ⊆ 0[[ψ]]⇒ 1[[ϕ∧ψ]] = 1[[ϕ]]) . If penguin∧bird is equivalent
to penguin, then Principle 3 makes all the preferential information based on penguin applicable, while the
preferential information based on bird may be invalid for penguin ∧ bird.
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Static Language (L): A set of literals: IP ∪ {¬p | p ∈ IP}
Dynamic Language (L∗): L+ {[ . ]+µ , 〈 . 〉+µ }
States (S): arbitrary nonempty set.
Order (⊑): arbitrary preorder over S.
Interpretation ([[.]]): A function L 7→ ℘(S) such that
(i) ∀ϕ ∈ L, s, t ∈ S : s ⊑ t, s ∈ [[ϕ]]⇒ t ∈ [[ϕ]].
(ii) ∀p ∈ IP : [[p]] ∩ [[¬p]] = ∅.
(iii) ∀ϕ ∈ L : [[ϕ]] ∩minM S = ∅.
Table 4: A Class of Propositional Information Models
4.1 A Simple Propositional Preferential Dynamic Logic
Table 4 gives a dml-specification of a simple dynamic propositional logic. The single prefer-
ential extension of this logic illustrates how preferential entailments are established according
to the definitions given in the previous section. The information states of this model are
partial truth value assignments for the propositional atoms: an atom is either true, false,
or undefined. The information order is arbitrary, while the interpretation function is (i)
monotonic, that is, expansions contain more atomic information and (ii) coherent , that is,
expansions contain no contradictory information, and furthermore, there is a constraint that
(iii) the minimal states have empty atomic content.
Let M be the class of all single-preferential enrichments of this class of information
models subject to both Principle 1 (Realism) and Principle 2 (Minimal Preference) defined
in the previous section. Let {bird, penguin, can–fly} ⊆ IP , and let Γ be the following set of
L∗p-formulae:
{[ p bird ]+µ can–fly, [ p bird ]+µ ¬penguin, [ p penguin ]+µ ¬can–fly, [penguin ]+µ bird}, 18(19)
then:
bird |≈min+µ
MΓ
can–fly and bird, penguin |≈min+µ
MΓ
¬can–fly.(20)
This entailment is validated by the following derivation for all models N ∈MΓ:
〈〈bird〉〉+µN,min =
1[[bird]]+µN,min and
〈〈bird, penguin〉〉+µN,min =
1[[bird, penguin]]+µN,min =
[[bird, p penguin]]+µN,min = [[p penguin]]
+µ
N,min ⊆ [[¬can–fly]]N .
By definition of the entailment |≈min+µ
MΓ
, we obtain the results of (20).
Next, suppose that {republican, pacifist, quaker} ⊆ IP , and
∆ = {[p quaker ]+µ pacifist, [p republican ]+µ ¬pacifist}.(21)
Here, the preferential readings of quaker and republican contradict each other. One may
expect that we get quaker, republican |≈min+µM∆ pacifist, because the preferences of the last
sentence are taken to be weaker in the definition (17). This is not the case, however, because
18The set Γ prescribes that ‘normal birds can fly’, ‘normal birds are not penguins’, ‘normal penguins
cannot fly’ and that ‘penguins are birds’.
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it is possible that a republican cannot be a normal quaker ([ republican ]+µ [p quaker ]+µ⊥)
or vice versa ([quaker ]+µ [p republican ]+µ⊥).
If such preferential blocks are removed, we obtain order-sensitive entailments:
quaker, republican |≈min+µ
M∆′
pacifist and
republican, quaker |≈min+µ
M∆′
¬pacifist ,
(22)
with ∆′ denoting the set:
∆ ∪ {[quaker ]+µ 〈p republican 〉+µ⊤, [ republican ]+µ 〈p quaker 〉+µ⊤}.19(23)
Let N be the class of double-preferential enrichments of the model given in Table 4 subject
to the realism and minimal preference principles on both classes. Let ∆′′ be the set
{[p1 quaker ]
+µ pacifist, [p2 quaker ]
+µ quaker,
[p2 republican ]
+µ ¬pacifist}
⋃
{[quaker ]+µ 〈pi republican 〉
+µ⊤,
[ republican ]+µ 〈pi quaker 〉
+µ⊤ | i = 1, 2} .
(24)
The second rule says that the p2-reading of quaker does not entail any information in
addition to its indefeasible reading. In this setting, the two variants in (22) yield the same
conclusion dominated by the p2-reading of republican:
quaker, republican |≈min+µM∆′′ ¬pacifist and
republican, quaker |≈min+µ
M∆′′
¬pacifist .
(25)
4.2 A First-order Preferential Dynamic Semantics
We will now come to an analysis of the discourses with ambiguous pronouns discussed in
Section 2. Typical dynamic semantic analyses of discourse, such as the relational semantics
for dynamic predicate logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) or first-order DRT such as pre-
sented, for example, in Muskens, Benthem, and Visser (1997),20 do not yield a satisfactory
preferential dynamic semantics when we integrate them with the preferential machinery of
the previous section. In these types of semantic theories, dynamicity is restricted to the
value assignment of variables for interpretation of possible anaphoric links, but to account
for anaphora resolution we need a logic that supports a preferential interplay of variable as-
signments, predicates, names, and propositions. In the terminology of Jaspars and Krahmer
(1996), we need to ‘dynamify’ more parameters of first-order logic than just the variable
assignments.21 To arrive at such extended dynamics over first-order models, we will estab-
19Take ⊤ = [ p ]+µ p.
20Jaspars and Krahmer (1996) discuss the DML-specification of this semantics for DRT. On the basis of
these DML-specifications, one can transfer the present definitions of preferential dynamic entailment to a
range of dynamic semantics.
21Benthem and Cepparello (1994) discuss such further dynamification. Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman
(1996) propose a semantic theory that combines ‘propositional’ and ‘variable’ dynamics, introducing a
dynamic semantics over assignment-world pairs. It may be possible to obtain a suitable preferential extension
of this type of semantics for our purposes as well.
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States (S): A collection of quadruples s = 〈Ds, Isp , I
s
c , I
s
v〉 with D
s a
nonempty set of individuals, Isp : Pred
n −→ ℘((Ds)n) the
local interpretation of predicates, Isc : Con ❀ D a partial
local interpretation of constants, and Isv : Var❀ D a partial
variable assignment .
Order (⊑): A preorder over S such that
(i) For all s, t ∈ S if s ⊑ t then Ds ⊆ Dt, Isp(P ) ⊆ I
t
p(P ) for all
predicates P , Isc (c) = I
t
c(c) for all c ∈ Dom(I
s
c ) and I
s
v(x) = I
t
v(x)
for all x ∈ Dom(Isv).
(ii) For all s, t ∈ S if s ⊑ t, d ∈ Dt and x ∈ Var \Dom(Isv), then there
exists u ∈ S such that s ⊑ u and Dt = Du, Itp = I
u
p , I
t
c = I
u
c ,
Dom(Iuv ) = Dom(I
s
v) ∪ {x} and I
u
v (x) = d.
(iii) For all s ∈ minM S: I
s
p(P ) = ∅ for all predicates P and Dom(I
s
c ) =
Dom(Isv) = ∅.
Interpretation ([[.]]): [[Pt1 . . . tn]] = {s ∈ S | 〈Ist (t1), . . . , I
s
t (tn)〉 ∈ I
s
p(P )},
[[t1 = t2]] = {s ∈ S | Ist (t1) = I
s
t (t2)},
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ∩ [[ψ]], [[ϕ ∨ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ∪ [[ψ]], [[⊥]] = ∅.
Table 5: A Class of First-order Information Models
lish a combination of the ‘ordinary’ dynamics-over-assignments semantics with the models
of information growth used in possible world semantics for classes of constructive logics.22
Let us first present the class of our information models. The basic linguistic ingredients
are the same as for first-order logic: Con a set of constants, Var a disjoint countably infinite
set of variables, and for each natural number n a set of n-ary predicates Predn. The static
language is the same as for first-order logic except for quantifiers and negation. The dynamic
language supplies the formalism with dynamic modal operators [ . ]+µ and 〈 . 〉+µ :
Atoms = {Pt1 . . . tn | P ∈ Pred
n, ti ∈ Con ∪ Var}
∪{t1 = t2 | ti ∈ Con ∪ Var}
L = Atoms+ {∧,∨,⊥}
L∗ = L ∗ {[ . ]+µ , 〈 . 〉+µ }.
(26)
Table 5 presents the intended L-information models. The growth of the information
order ⊑ is subject to three constraints. The first one (i) says that all the parameters of
first-order logic, that is, the domains, interpretation of predicates and constants, and the
variable assignments, grow with the information order. The other two constraints seem
unorthodox. The second constraint (ii) ensures the freedom of variables in this setting. It
tells us that in each state the range of a ‘fresh’ variable is unlimited, that is, it may have
the value of each current or ‘future’ individual. This means that for every individual d in
an extension t, every variable x that does not yet have an assigned value may be assigned
the value d in a state containing the same information as t. This constraint differentiates
the roles of constants and variables in this setting. The last constraint (iii) says that
the minimal information states do not contain atomic information. It was also used for
propositional information models in Subsection 4.1.
The interpretation function is more or less standard. Verification of an atomic sentence
requires determination of all the present terms, also for identities.
22See Troelstra and Van Dalen (1988) or Fitting (1969) for the case of intuitionistic logic.
19
Quantification can be defined by means of the dynamic modal operators. For example,
(27) means that the Meet-relation is symmetric and Greet-relation is irreflexive.
[Meetxy ]+µ Meet yx and [Greetxy ]+µ [x = y ]+µ⊥.(27)
Ordinary universal quantification can be defined by using identity and extension modality:
∀xϕ = [x = x ]+ ϕ.23 Negation can also be defined by means of a dynamic modal operator:
¬ϕ = [ϕ ]+⊥.24 A typical (singular) preferential sentence would be
[pMeetxy ]+µ [pGreetuv ]+µ (u = x ∧ v = y),(28)
which means that the concatenation of the preferential reading of a Meeting and a Greeting
pair makes the variables match according to the grammatical parallelism preference.25
4.3 First-order Constraints for Preferential Dynamic Reasoning
To model the preferential effects on ambiguous pronouns discussed in Section 2, we need
to postulate several first-order variants of the pragmatic meta-constraints discussed in Sub-
section 3.4. The first-order expressivity of the languages L and L∗ given in (26) and the
fine structure of the information models presented in Table 5 enable us to calibrate these
meta-constraints for preferential interpretation on first-order discourse representations.
We will adopt only Principle 1 (Realism) in its purely propositional form. Three other
constraints that we will impose on preferential interpretation regulate some ‘harmless’ in-
terplay of preferences and terms. Let M = 〈S,⊑, [[.]]〉 be a preferential L-model with
[[.]] =
〈
0[[.]], 1[[.]]
〉
.
To begin with, fresh variables have no content, and therefore, we do not allow them
to block preferential interpretation. In other words, a proposition that contains only fresh
variables as terms always has a preferential +µ-reading whenever it has an indefeasible
+µ-meaning. In fact, this is a variant of Principle 2, the principle of minimal preference.
Principle 5 (Minimal Preference for Fresh Variables) Let s be an information state in an
information model of the type described in Table 5. If Dom(Isv ) has an empty intersection
with the variables occurring in a given proposition ϕ, and no constants occur in ϕ, then
[[ϕ]]+µM,s 6= ∅ ⇒ [[pϕ]]
+µ
M,s 6= ∅.
The two other constraints for first-order discourses are obtained by weakening Principle 3
(Preservation of Equivalence). Although this principle itself is too strong, we would like to
have some innocent logical transparency of the preferential operator. We thus postulate
Principles 6 and 7.
23Note that to get the proper universal reading here, we need to be sure that x is a fresh variable (e.g.,
in the minimal states).
24A proper definition of existential quantification does not seem feasible since 〈 x = x 〉+µ ϕ is not persis-
tent. A better candidate is ¬∀x¬ϕ, which behaves persistently. For ⊥ we may take 〈x = x 〉+ (x = x).
25A general implementation of the parallelism preference would require a second-order scheme.
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Principle 6 (Preservation under Renaming Fresh Variables.) Preferential readings should
be maintained when fresh variables are replaced by other fresh variables:
∀x, y ∈ Var \ Dom(Isv ) : s ∈ [[pϕ]]M ⇔ s ∈ [[pϕ[x/y]]]M .
Principle 7 (Preservation of Identities.) Preferential readings should be insensitive to
substitutions of equals:
∀t1, t2 ∈ Var ∪ Con : s ∈ [[pϕ ∧ t1 = t2]]M ⇔ s ∈ [[pϕ[t1/t2]]]M .
4.4 Preferential Dynamic Disambiguation of Pronouns
We will now account for the discourse examples with ambiguous pronouns discussed in
Section 2 using the first-order preferential discourse logic defined here.
4.4.1 Single-preferential Structure
We will first examine the single-preferential structure of the ‘John met Bill’ sentences (1)–(4).
Assume the single-preferential extensions M of the models presented in Table 5 subject to
Principles 1, 5, 6, and 7. This model, together with the background information Γ containing
(27) and (28), yields the intended defeasible conclusions as follows:
x = j ∧ y = b,Meetxy,Greetuv |≈min+µMΓ (u = j ∧ v = b)
x = b ∧ y = j,Meetxy,Greetuv |≈min+µMΓ (u = b ∧ v = j).
(29)
This class also entails the invalidity of this kind of a determinate resolution for the ‘John
and Bill met’-case (3):
x = j ∧ y = b,Meetxy ∧Meet yx,
Greetuv 6|≈min+µMΓ (u = j ∧ v = b).
(30)
The underlying reason is that the preferential meaning of Meetxy ∧Meet yx may be dif-
ferent from that of Meetxy or Meet yx, although these three sentences all have the same
indefeasible meaning in MΓ.
For discourse (1) extended with the sentence John greeted back in (4), the defeasible
conclusion of the first discourse in (29) will be invalid over MΓ:
x = j ∧ y = b,Meetxy,Greetuv,
Greetxu 6|≈min+µ
MΓ
(u = j ∧ v = b).
(31)
The reason is that for every model M ∈MΓ:
∀s ∈ S : s ∈ 〈〈x = j ∧ y = b,Meetxy,Greetuv〉〉+µM,min ⇒ [[Greetxu]]
+µ
M,s = ∅.(32)
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4.4.2 Double-preferential Structure
We will now illustrate how the overriding effects of commonsense preferences illustrated in
(8) and (9) come about in a double-preferential extension of the dml-setting in Table 5. In
these cases, we hypothesized that the commonsense preferences about hitting / injuring /
breaking override the syntactic preferences underlying the ‘John met Bill’ examples (1)–(4).
We postulate the following double-preferential background for the ‘hitting’ scene:
[p1Hit xy ]
+µ [p1 Injured v ]
+µ v = x and
[p2Hit xy ]
+µ [ Injured v ]+µ v = y .
(33)
The p2-class is associated with commonsense preferences with a higher preferential rank,
while the p1-class is associated with ‘syntactic’ preferences with a lower preferential rank.
Note that we take the commonsense impact of the word Hit so strongly that every Injured v-
continuation — not only the preferred readings of this sentence — leads to the defeasible
conclusion that the hittee is the one who must be injured.
The above double-preferential account also enables a formal distinction among discourses
F (same as (8) involving Bill), G (involving Schwarzenegger), and H (involving the Termi-
nator) in Table 1, whose differences are exhibited in the survey results presented in Table 2.
Let N be the class of double-preferential enrichments of the models of Table 5 satisfying
the same principles asM for both preference classes. When ∆ represents the set containing
the two preferential update rules given in (33), we obtain a determinate preference for F:
x = j ∧ y = b,Hitxy, Injured v |≈min+µN∆ v = b.(34)
Let ∆′ be the extension of ∆ enriched with the following additional commonsense rules,
where sch denotes Schwarzenegger:
[p2 Injuredx ]
+µ [x = sch ]+µ⊥.(35)
This rule says that if something is injured, then it is not expected to be Schwarzenegger.
We then obtain a case of indeterminacy for G:
x = j ∧ y = sch,Hitxy, Injured v 6|≈min+µN
∆′
v = sch and
x = j ∧ y = sch,Hitxy, Injured v 6|≈min+µN∆′ v = j.
(36)
Let ∆′′ be the union of ∆ and the following additional rules, where the constant tm denotes
the Terminator:
[ j = tm ]+µ⊥ and [ Injured tm ]+µ⊥.(37)
The second sentence says that the Terminator cannot be injured. This background infor-
mation establishes the preferred meaning of H:
x = j ∧ y = tm,Hitxy, Injured v |≈min+µN
∆′′
v = j.(38)
Substitution of Θ = ∆′ ∪∆′′ for ∆ in (34), for ∆′ in (36) and for ∆′′ in (38) yields the same
conclusions as above. In summary, if Θ was our background knowledge, then the discourse
F predicts that Bill is injured, while G yields indeterminacy in its preferential meaning.
Discourse H preferentially entails that John is injured.
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5 Conclusions and Future Prospects
As a general logical basis for an integrated model of discourse semantics and pragmatics, we
have combined dynamics and preferential reasoning in a dynamic modal logic setting. This
logical setting encodes the basic discourse pragmatic properties of dynamicity, indetermi-
nacy, defeasibility, and preference class interactions posited in an earlier linguistic analysis
of the preferential effects on ambiguous pronouns. It also provides a logical architecture in
which to implement a set of meta-constraints that regulates the general interplay of defea-
sible and indefeasible static and dynamic interpretation. We have given a number of such
meta-constraint candidates here. Further logical and empirical investigations are needed
before we can choose the exact set of constraints we need.
We demonstrated how a general model theory of dynamic logic can be enriched with
a preferential structure to result in a relatively simple preferential model theory. We de-
fined the preferential dynamic entailments over given pieces of discourse, which predict that
preferential information is used as much as possible and as early as possible to conclude dis-
course interpretations. That is, earlier defeasible conclusions are harder to defeat than more
recent ones. We have also defined a logical machinery for predicting overriding relationships
among preference classes. Overriding takes place when later indefeasible information defeats
earlier preferential conclusions, or when a reading corresponding to a preference class of a
higher priority becomes empty and a lower preference class takes over. These preference
class overrides give rise to conflict resolutions that are not predictable from straightforward
applications of the Penguin Principle.
Although our focus is on pronoun resolution preferences in this paper, we hope that
our logical machinery is also adequate for characterizing the conflict resolution patterns
among various preferences and preference classes relevant to a wider range of discourse
phenomena. The present perspective of preference interactions assumes that preferences
belong to different classes, or modules, and that there are certain common conflict resolution
patterns within each class and across different classes. Class-internal preference interactions
yield either determinate or indeterminate preferences. Class-external preference interactions
are dictated by certain preexisting class-level overriding relations, according to which the
conflicts among the respective conclusions coming from each preference class are either
resolved (by class-level overrides), ending up with the preferential conclusions of the highest
preference class (whether it is determinate or indeterminate), or unresolved, leading to
mixed-class preferential ambiguities. We would like to investigate the applicability of this
perspective to a wider range of discourse phenomena.26
The present logical characterization of preferential dynamics may be extended and/or
revised in two major areas. One is the application of actions other than updates, +µ. For
example, discourse-level repairs as in (5) also require reductions, −, and/or downdates,
−µ. The other is the relational definition of preferences on the basis of an additional
structuring of the information order ⊑ instead of the static interpretation function [[.]]. Such
an alternative definition would enable us to implement ‘graded’ preferences (Delgrande,
26It is encouraging that the recent spread of Optimality Theory from phonology (Prince and Smolensky,
1993) to syntax (e.g., MIT Workshop on Optimality in Syntax, 1995) seems to indicate the descriptive ade-
quacy of the fundamental preference interaction scheme, where potentially conflicting defeasible conclusions
compete for the ‘maximal harmony.’
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1988), that is, every state gets a certain preferential status with respect to a proposition.
In our paper, states were simply declared to be preferential or nonpreferential with respect
to a proposition. Graded preferences may be required for fine-tuning and coordinating the
overall discourse pragmatics. A question related to this topic is whether the use of graded
preferences would make the setting of multiple preference classes superfluous.
We might also be able to extend the framework to cover on-line sentence processing
pragmatics, where the word-by-word or constituent-by-constituent dynamicity affects the
meaning of the utterance being interpreted. The utterance-internal garden path and repair
phenomena will then be treated analogously to the discourse-level counterparts.
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